Chanson, Ding and Salomaa have recently constructed several classes of authentication codes using certain classes of functions. In this paper, we further extend that work by constructing two classes of Cartesian authentication codes using the logarithm functions. The codes constructed here involve the theory of cyclotomy and are better than a subclass of Helleseth-Johansson's codes and Bierbrauer's codes in terms of the maximum success probability with respect to the substitution attack.
Introduction
Authentication codes were considered in 1974 by Gilbert and Sloane [5] . In the model of authentication theory described by Simmons [11] , there are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter wants to send information to the receiver through a public channel which is subject to active attacks, while the opponent wants to deceive the receiver. Without observing any message from the transmitter to the receiver, the opponent impersonates the transmitter by sending his message to the receiver, causing the receiver to accept a fraudulent message as authentic. This is called the impersonation attack, and we use P d 0 to denote the opponent's maximum success probability with respect to this attack. Having observed one message from the transmitter to the receiver, the opponent replaces the original message with his own message. This is called the substitution attack, and we use P d 1 to denote the opponent's maximum success probability with respect to this attack.
To protect against these attacks, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret key, which is used in an authentication code. In this model there is only one receiver, and it is the model considered in this paper. For multireceiver authentication codes, the reader is referred to [4, 7, 9, 10] .
A systematic Cartesian authentication code is a code in which the source state (i.e., the plaintext) is concatenated with an authenticator (also called a tag) to form a message which is sent via a channel. Such a code is a 5-tuple (S, E, M, T , f ), where S is the set of source states, E is the set of keys, and T is the set of authenticators, M is the set of all possible messages, and f : S × E → T is the authentication mapping. Each function f (·, e) is called an encoding rule. When the transmitter wants to send the information s ∈ S using a key e ∈ E, which is secretly shared with the receiver, he transmits the message m = (s, t), where t = f (s, e) ∈ T is the tag (authenticator). When the receiver receives the message m = (s, t), he checks its authenticity by verifying whether t = f (s, e) or not using the secret key e ∈ E. If the equality holds, the message is regarded as authentic and is accepted. Otherwise the message is rejected.
Combinatorial designs have been successfully used to construct certain optimal authentication codes [8, 12] . Certain algebraic curves give also very good authentication codes [1, 13] . Chanson, Ding and Salomaa [2] have recently presented two constructions of authentication codes using certain classes of functions. Some of their codes are optimal. In this paper, using the framework of [2] we construct authentication codes with logarithm functions. The authentication codes constructed in this paper are better than a subclass of Helleseth-Johansson's codes and Bierbrauer's codes in terms of the success probability P d 1 with respect to the substitution attack.
The first class of Cartesian authentication codes based on logarithm functions
Let F be a mapping from A to B, where (A, +) and (B, +) are finite abelian groups. The first construction of [2] gives authentication codes
where the set of source states is (S, +) = (A, +), the set of keys (E, +) = (A, +), the tag space is (T , +) = (B, +), and the authentication mapping f from S × E to T is defined by
It is assumed that there is a probability distribution on both the source state space and the key space. In this construction, the keys and the source states are equally likely. The message space M = S × T , which depends totally on S and T .
As for the code of (1), the two deception probabilities are given in the following theorem [2] , whose proof is included here for completeness. Theorem 1. Let (S, +) and (T , +) be finite abelian groups, and let F be a mapping from S to T . Then for the authentication code (S, E, T , f ) of (1) defined above, we have
where F (S) is the image of S under the mapping F .
Proof. In an impersonation attack, the opponent wants to generate a new message m = (s , t ) by choosing a source state s and an e ∈ E and computing t = F (s + e ). The new message m is then inserted into the channel. This attack is successful if and only if F (s + e) = t . We now need to compute the probability Pr(F (s + e) = t ). Note that the keys and source states are equiprobable. We have
In a substitution attack, the opponent observed a message m = (s, t) and replaces it with another message m = (s , t ), where s / = s . Since the keys and source states are equiprobable, the probability of success of the substitution attack is
With the framework above, several classes of authentication codes were constructed by Chanson, Ding and Salomaa [2] . Their codes were based on several classes of functions. In this paper, we use some types of logarithm functions to construct a new class of authentication codes. Throughout this paper we define Z d = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}. It is known that P d 0 P d 1 for all systematic Cartesian authentication codes [12] .
To describe authentication codes based on the logarithm functions, we make use of the theory of cyclotomy. Let GF(q) be a finite field, and let
, the multiplicative group generated by α d , and
are called cyclotomic classes of order d. The cyclotomic numbers of order d with respect to GF(q) are defined as
Clearly, there are at most d 2 different cyclotomic numbers of order d [3] .
To prove properties of the authentication codes dealt with in the following sections, for each j ∈ Z d we define
and
Proof. By the definition of F (x), we have
It then follows from Theorem 1 that
To prove the inequalities for P d 1 , we need to determine
, where 0 / = a ∈ GF(q). Let
. By Lemma 5 in Appendix A, we have
By Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 in Appendix A, 
It is obvious that
This completes the proof.
For the authentication codes of Theorem 2, the success probability of impersonation P d 0 is essentially 1/d when d is small compared to q. The probability of successful substitution P d 1 is bounded below and above by the maximum cyclotomic number of order d. In general it is hard to determine the maximum cyclotomic number of order d for large d.
The codes described in Theorem 2 do contain very good codes, as given in the following theorem. and
, 
where 0 i, j d − 1 and 0 u, v p s . Define
Then it follows from (4) that
Note that the equation The class of codes of Theorem 3 are the best among all the codes described in Theorem 2, because at least one cyclotomic number of order d must be 2. This is justified by one of the following two formulas [3] :
Comparison with Helleseth-Johansson's codes
We now compare the codes of Theorem 3 with a subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and Johansson [6] . They constructed a class of codes with parameters
where r is a power of a prime p, and D 1 is an integer. For the two codes to be comparable, we need to set m = n = s, r = p > 2, and D = 2. Then the subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and Johansson have parameters
Note that the tag space of the subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and Johansson has one more element than the codes in Theorem 3. So max{P d 0 , P d 1 } = P d 1 for the former should be smaller than that for the latter. However, if p s 4, we have
Hence from Table 1 the codes of Theorem 3 are better than the subclass of codes constructed by Helleseth and Johansson. Note that while the parameters of Helleseth-Johansson's codes are more flexible, the two code construction schemes are comparable only when the above mentioned conditions are satisfied. 
The second class of authentication codes based on the logarithm function
Let F be a mapping from A to B, where (A, +) and (B, +) are finite abelian groups. The second construction of [2] gives authentication codes
where
the set of source states is (S, +) = (A, +), the set of keys (E, +) = (A × B, +), the tag space is (T , +) = (B, +), and the authentication mapping f from S × E to T is defined by f (s, (e a , e b )) = F (s + e a ) + e b , (e a , e b ) ∈ A × B.
In this construction, all keys and all state sources are equally likely. Hence, the number of keys (encoding rules) is equal to the number of messages, while in the first construction given in Section 2 the number of keys (encoding rules) is much smaller.
This construction of systematic authentication codes is quite general. The key task is to search for functions that give good authentication codes within the framework of this construction. In this section, we use some logarithm functions to construct another class of authentication codes. Proof. By Theorem 1,
s∈S,t∈f (S,E)
|{(e a , e b ) | t = F (s + e a ) + e b }| |A||B| 
Case 2: b mod d / = 0, by Lemmas 5 and 7 in the Appendix A,
−b , we consider the equation
We now check whether this equation has a solution. otherwise.
All the values of P d 1 in Case 2 are greater than or equal to the values of P d 1 in Case 1. By substituting q = dl + 1, the theorem is proved. [6] There are authentication codes with parameters [6] 
Comparison with another class of codes described in
These codes are usually constructed by using linear functions in a natural way. For these codes we have gcd(|S|, |T |) = r min(m,n) / = 1. However, for the codes of Theorem 4 we have
and the corresponding P d 1 is slightly bigger than 1 |T | . Under the condition of (12), it may be proved that no code with
r n exists, because orthogonal arrays with corresponding parameters may not exist. Hence the parameters of (11) are of different types compared with those in Theorem 4. On the other hand, the code construction in Theorem 4 uses the logarithm function.
Comparison with Bierbrauer's codes
We now compare the codes of Theorem 4 with Bierbrauer's codes [1] . Bierbrauer employed the composition method to geometry codes and obtained an authentication code with the following parameters:
where r is a power of a prime p, and s t are natural numbers. In order for the codes to be comparable to the codes of Theorem 4 we set s = t. Then (13) and (14) become
In this case we have |E| = |S||T |. For the code of Theorem 4, we have also |E| = |S||T | and
But the success probability of the substitution attack on the code of Theorem 4 is
Thus in the case that |S| > 2|T |, the code of Theorem 4 is better than the subclass of codes of [1] in the special case s = t. Note that the codes of Theorem 4 are comparable with only this subclass of Bierbrauer's codes due to restrictions on the code parameters.
Conclusions
In this paper within the framework of Chanson, Ding and Salomaa [2] , we presented two classes of systematic authentication codes using the theory of cyclotomy and the logarithm function. In all the cases that the codes are comparable, our codes are better than Helleseth-Johansson's codes and also Bierbrauer's codes. With the known relations between universal hash families and authentication codes [13, 14] , the authentication codes described in this paper may be used to construct universal hash families.
The parameters of the authentication codes described in Theorem 2 are flexible in that d could be any proper divisor of q − 1. However, d must be chosen carefully in order to get good authentication codes. For example, if q = p 2s and d = p s + 1, the code is bad in the sense that P d 1 is quite large. Thus the codes of Theorem 2 contain both good and bad codes.
A class of very good authentication codes based on algebraic curves were constructed by Xing, Wang and Lam [13] . Unfortunately the codes described in this paper cannot be compared with the Xing-WangLam codes because their parameters are not comparable. Dividing both sides by q and using the definition of θ k * prove this lemma.
